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Like every other turn in this long case, the tentative settlement to United States v. 
Microsoft Corporation has generated controversy. Some critics have argued that the proposed 
accord does not go far  enough in punishing Microsoft. In this essay, I reach a different 
conclusion: this settlement is preferable to the alternative of additional litigation. 
 
United States v. Microsoft:  
The Benefits of Settlement 
Robert W. Hahn
1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Like every other turn in this long case, the tentative settlement to United States v. 
Microsoft Corporation has generated controversy. Some critics, mainly Microsoft’s most vocal 
competitors in the technology sector, have argued that the proposed accord does not go far 
enough in punishing Microsoft for perceived wrongdoings.
2 Reviewing the case as an 
economist, however, leads me to quite a different conclusion: this settlement is preferable to the 
alternative of additional litigation.  
First, this proposed settlement (like most legal settlements) is a compromise reflecting 
the reality that continuing the trial would put the government case at risk and would expose 
Microsoft to an uncertain outcome. For its part, the Department of Justice dropped several 
elements of the conduct remedies that they had won in the initial trial and that they were going 
to seek again; they also dropped the proposed break-up, a remedy that the Court of Appeals 
was particularly skeptical of. For its part, Microsoft made some significant concessions, such as 
promising to document the proprietary protocols used for communications between Windows 
                                                 
1 Mr. Hahn is director of the American Enterprise Institute-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, a 
resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a research associate at Harvard University. He also has 
consulted to Microsoft and other information technology companies. The views in this paper solely reflect those 
of the author. 
2 See, for example, Sun Microsystems’ comments as reported in the New York Times article, Stephen Labaton and 
Steve Lohr “States Weigh Going It Alone in Legal Battle with Microsoft,” New York Times, November 5, 2001, 
p. 1, col. 5.  
operating systems running on PCs and servers (which were not at issue in the case), to induce 
the Justice Department and nine states to accept the revised proposed Final Judgment  — 
concessions the government might well have to give up if litigation were to continue.   
 Second, independent software developers and manufacturers selling computers loaded 
with Microsoft software have much at stake in these proceedings. Reducing the considerable
business uncertainty engendered by ongoing litigation would thus serve the interests of the 
software and hardware industries in general.    2
Third, the proposed settlement fully addresses the Microsoft acts confirmed to be 
anticompetitive in the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals. Many aspects of trial judge 
Thomas Penfield Jackson’s ruling against Microsoft were either vacated by the Court of 
Appeals or remanded to the District Court with instructions that put a heavy burden on the 
plaintiffs to reestablish liability. The proposed remedy recognizes that reality and focuses on 
those points of conduct found to be anticompetitive. Indeed, Microsoft offers important 
concessions addressing some of the plaintiffs’ concerns that are not supported by the Court of 
Appeals ruling.  
In the following pages, I discuss these three points in more detail. I conclude that the 
proposed settlement is better than the alternative of extended and costly court proceedings. 
II.  SETTLEMENTS IN GENERAL: COMPROMISE THAT REDUCES 
UNCERTAINTY 
Economic analysis suggests that, in disputes, compromise should be the rule rather than 
the exception. According to one of the most basic tenets of economics, “when transaction costs 
are low, parties will voluntarily transact if a mutually beneficial transaction is possible.”
3 And, 
in fact, the vast majority of all legal disputes are settled.
4 
Settlements of pending litigation generally represent a compromise that takes known 
information into account and offers advantages to both parties. If a settlement is not balanced, 
the option of continuing the litigation will appeal to one side and will stall negotiations. Thus, 
the fact that Microsoft and the government reached an agreement after numerous unsuccessful 
attempts to do so in the past indicates that the proposed settlement is not a “victory” for 
Microsoft or the government, but a middle ground reflecting the facts of the case, the court 
rulings to date, and a recognition that continued litigation was a gamble for both sides. 
Apart from satisfying the two parties directly involved, litigation settlements are also 
commonly viewed as good for society. In discussing settlements in patent disputes, FTC 
Commissioner Thomas Leary observed that, “Settlements can conserve public and private 
                                                 
3 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4
th Ed., Little, Brown & Co., p. 554 (1992). 
4 Posner, p. 554. See also Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 at 926, nn.10-11 (2000).    3
resources and eliminate uncertainty …”
5 Carl Shapiro, an economist at the University of 
California, echoed and expanded on that observation: “Settlements of litigation generally are 
recognized to provide a number of private and social benefits. Private benefits include the 
avoidance of litigation costs and the resolution of uncertainty. Social benefits include savings 
on court costs and/or reduction of congestion in the court system.”
6 
This is hardly a novel view among business executives. In the early 1980s, AT&T faced 
the threat of a court-decreed breakup. Rather than fight the decree and prolong the uncertainty, 
AT&T Chairman Charles Brown opted to negotiate a settlement: “We were confident we 
would ultimately disprove the government’s contentions, but we concluded that getting rid of 
the terrible uncertainty and capitalizing on future opportunities were more important than 
vindicating our past behavior.”
7 
III.  THE SETTLEMENT WOULD REDUCE UNCERTAINTY IN THE HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY SECTOR  
The reduction in uncertainty from a settlement of this case would be a boon not just for 
Microsoft, but for much of the high technology sector as well. Companies that produce 
complementary products, such as applications programs that run on the Windows operating 
system, are, of course, directly affected by the rulings in this case. The government has already 
recognized this fact: “Lots of small software-development firms want to work closely with 
Microsoft to get their products commercialized, and they do so in a way that produces good 
software.”
8 A study of how past antitrust enforcement involving Microsoft affected the stock of 
159 other computer technology companies suggests that the impact is far broader. George 
                                                 
5 Thomas Leary, “Antitrust Issues in Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes,” Remarks prepared for Sixth 
Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum, Northwestern University School of Law, November 3, 2000, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learypharma.htm. 
6 Carl Shapiro, “Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements,” University of California Working Paper, May 1, 2001, 
available at  http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/wp/501.pdf. Although Professor Shapiro notes 
potential social costs to settlement, in particular the risk of foregoing the establishment of legal precedents, they 
do not appear to apply in this case. Professor Shapiro goes on to note, “generally speaking, the courts have 
strongly favored settlements.” 
7  Aaron Pressman, “Learning From Ma Bell,”  The Standard, May 15, 2000, available at 
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,14747,00.html.  
8 Assistant Attorney General Charles James, as quoted by Drew Clark, “Behind the Microsoft Deal,” National 
Journal, November 17, 2001.   4
Bittlingmayer and Thomas Hazlett found that the share prices of companies in the computer 
sector moved with Microsoft’s share price in response to antitrust enforcement actions aimed at 
Microsoft.
9 The authors examined 54 incidents of federal antitrust enforcement action from 
1991 through 1997 that altered Microsoft’s business prospects, classifying those actions as 
either pro-enforcement or anti-enforcement, and then tying the public announcement of the 
actions to computer sector stock values.
10 The study tested the hypothesis that antitrust 
enforcement initiatives not fully anticipated by the markets would increase the value of the 
stock of Microsoft’s alleged victims  — direct competitors as well as customers heavily 
dependent on Microsoft products — while lowering the value of Microsoft stock. 
Bittlingmayer and Hazlett found the opposite: prices for the computer industry stocks 
moved with Microsoft stock prices in reaction to antitrust enforcement events involving 
Microsoft, not against them. In particular, changes in the stock prices for companies producing 
computer hardware, network products, semiconductors, and PC software were positively 
correlated with changes in Microsoft’s stock prices in response to antitrust enforcement news.
11 
The authors found that “investors appear to believe that antitrust enforcement increases the link 
between the fortunes of Microsoft and other computer firms.”
12 “Withdrawals from policy 
enforcement,” they concluded, “have been accompanied by positive shareholder returns 
throughout the computer sector.”
13 And that explains why, in the words of a wire-service 
reporter, the proposed settlement is likely to give a boost to “the entire technology industry.”
14  
                                                 
9 George Bittlingmayer and Thomas Hazlett, “DOS Kapital: Has antitrust action against Microsoft created value in 
the computer industry?,” 55 J. FIN. ECON. 329 (2000).  
10 The index of 159 non-Microsoft computer sector firms was constructed using publicly traded companies 
included in Hoover’s Guide to Computer Companies 1995. The companies were then assigned to one of nine 
industry segments based on their description in Hoover’s. The list of 54 events was created from the Wall Street 
Journal Index. Bittlingmayer and Hazlett, pp. 334-339. 
11 The study also examined the stock prices of Microsoft’s individual competitors, namely Netscape, Sun, Novell, 
and Apple. They found no systematic evidence that these likely beneficiaries realized higher returns when 
antitrust enforcement measures were taken against Microsoft. Bittlingmayer and Hazlett, p. 350. 
12 Bittlingmayer and Hazlett, p. 347 (italics in original). The authors also estimated the dollar value of stock price 
declines associated with increased antitrust enforcement to be around $35 billion. While the standard error 
associated with the estimate was large, implying that this number should be “taken with a grain of salt,” the 
authors concluded that it nonetheless “offer[s] some idea of the importance for the computer industry as a whole 
of policies directed against Microsoft.” Bittlingmayer and Hazlett, pp. 342-343. 
13 Bittlingmayer and Hazlett, p. 352. 
14 Rob Lever, “Deal in Microsoft Antitrust Case Uncertain,” Agence France-Presse, November 2, 2001.   5
IV.  THE SETTLEMENT ADDRESSES THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE COURT OF 
APPEALS DECISION 
Whether I or any other individual views the Court of Appeals ruling as consistent with 
good public policy is largely immaterial — it tells us which actions by Microsoft were or were 
not anticompetitive. And as Nicholas Economides, an economist at New York University’s 
Stern School of Business, notes, “The remedy has to be based on [the Court of Appeals ruling]. 
It should not punish Microsoft for things it was not found guilty of.”
15 Expanding on this point, 
Assistant Attorney General Charles James explained the logic behind the proposed settlement: 
People look at the Jackson decree, and then look at our decree, and perceive that it 
is weaker or compromised. I fundamentally disagree with that. The Jackson 
decree was premised on these liability findings that didn’t continue in the case 
after the court of appeals ruling. Second, the Jackson opinion did not ever 
undergo a true litigation process. There are a number of issues that would have 
been hotly contested. Finally, there were a number of things that would have been 
ineffective in the context of the software industry as we find it now. Looking at 
our decree from the standpoint of the case that emerged from the court of appeals, 
we think that in many respects it is certainly equal to and perhaps superior to the 
result that likely would have emerged in litigation.
16 
In particular, the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court finding that Microsoft’s 
inclusion of the Internet Explorer Web browser in Windows was illegal per se. It also reversed 
Judge Jackson’s ruling that Microsoft took anticompetitive actions to obtain  a monopoly in 
Web browsers. While the Court of Appeals did agree that Microsoft holds a monopoly in PC 
operating systems and has taken some anticompetitive actions to maintain (but not initially to 
gain) that monopoly, many of the specific charges were narrowed. In fact, the Court of Appeals 
decision vacated the District Court’s remedy because, among other things, the Court 
“drastically altered the scope of Microsoft’s liability.”
17 
The revised proposed Final Judgment is, in my opinion, based on the “limited ground of 
liability”
18 that the Court of Appeals upheld. First, it directly addresses all of the conduct that 
                                                 
15 As quoted by Lever supra note 14. 
16 Clark supra note 8. 
17 United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Opinion, United States v. Microsoft Corp, June 28, 
2001, available at http://ecfp.cadc.uscourts.gov/MS-Docs/1720/0.pdf, p. 106.  
18 Id., p. 106.   6
the Court of Appeals found anticompetitive. For example, the Court of Appeals found that 
Microsoft acted illegally in preventing PC manufacturers from deleting end-user access to 
Internet Explorer. The settlement explicitly gives computer makers that right — not just for 
Internet Explorer but also for many other software categories falling under the settlement’s 
definition of “middleware.” Similarly, the appeals decision found that Microsoft’s exclusive 
arrangements with Internet Access Providers (IAPs) hampered distribution of competing Web 
browsers and were illegal. The revised proposed Final Judgment broadly prohibits Microsoft 
from requiring IAPs or other companies to distribute Web browsing or other kinds of software 
exclusively or in any fixed percentage (even a low fixed percentage).  
Second, the settlement calls for information disclosures by Microsoft that go far beyond 
the behavior identified by the Court of Appeals as anticompetitive. For example, by requiring 
Microsoft to disclose software interfaces and related technical information, the settlement 
would make it even easier for software developers to create new middleware products that 
operate in the Windows environment. This requirement would prevent Microsoft from keeping 
secret information that is normally considered proprietary  — information that might give 
internally developed software a competitive edge.
19  
Charles James notes that the information disclosure aspect of the settlement goes 
beyond the issues of disclosure addressed in the case: “There had never been any allegation in 
the case that Windows was an essential facility, the proprietary technology for which had to be 
openly shared in the industry. So we are very pleased that we were able to secure this crucial 
provision in the proposed decree.”
20 Moreover, the proposed decree goes beyond the District 
Court’s order in requiring Microsoft to disclose communications protocols for servers that are 
embedded in the operating system. This aspect of the settlement makes it easier for server-
based applications to emerge as potential competitive alternatives to Microsoft’s operating 
systems.  
                                                 
19 This provision could also hinder software development. Certain interfaces are deemed “private” not to provide 
an internal competitive advantage but to allow for software design flexibility. By making public some of these 
interfaces, Microsoft would effectively be r equired to maintain them in all later software releases so that 
independent software developers could continue to depend on them  — even if a technologically superior 
interface were developed.   7
Finally, the proposed decree contains stringent enforcement provisions. It creates an 
independent three-person technical committee with broad, on-site review powers. It requires 
Microsoft to offer uniform license terms to the 20 largest computer manufacturers, thereby 
preventing Microsoft from sidestepping other provisions of the settlement through discounts 
and promotional deals. It gives the government authority to seek criminal and civil contempt 
sanctions in the event Microsoft violates the accord. And it grants the Court the discretion to 
extend the five-year term of the order by two years if Microsoft breaks the rules.  
Viewed in its entirety then, the settlement proposed by “…the Justice Department has 
fully and completely addressed the anti-competitive conduct that was outlined by the Court of 
Appeals against Microsoft.”
21 In fact, as mentioned above, it goes well beyond the Court of 
Appeals decision in addressing competition questions. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
 This proposed settlement not only addresses the behavior found illegal by the Court of 
Appeals, it regulates conduct unrelated to the Court’s findings. Plainly, Microsoft made 
considerable concessions to reach this settlement. And as the Assistant Attorney General 
Charles James has noted, the DOJ is unlikely to obtain a remedy more in keeping with the 
original trial Court’s findings through continued litigation.
22  
                                                                                                                                                           
20 Statement of Charles A. James Before the Committee of the Judiciary United States Senate, Concerning the 
Microsoft Settlement: A Look to the Future, December 12, 2000, available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/te121201f-james.htm . 
21 Attorney General John Ashcroft, as quoted by Frank James, “Microsoft Wins Big in Deal, Critics Say,” Chicago 
Tribune, November 3, 2001, p. 1. 
22 See supra note 15. 